Abstract This paper addresses the issue of whether voters indicate a preference for a government rather than, or in addition to a preference for a party, when they cast a ballot under the system of the Single Transferable Vote (STV). It thus contributes to the existing literature on strategic coalition voting by examining whether coalition preferences matter where electors are given the option to rank the parties in order of preference. The question then becomes: does this ranking reflect or signal a coalition preference? Using survey data from two Irish elections, this paper finds that whereas first preferences are closely aligned with coalition choices, Irish voters do not systematically use second preferences to express a view on their preferred coalition formation.
Introduction
In most multiparty systems, elections result in a coalition government being formed of two or more parties, with these coalition arrangements often decided after the election result is known. Voters can use the ballot box to express their wish for a party, and so effectively trust that party to act as they themselves would do when selecting, or turning down, coalition partners. Parties may also declare their preferred options to their voters, so the choice of party is made with some knowledge of its likely government partners. Even so, the voter generally has little choice beyond that of take-it or leave-it because she typically has only one vote to cast, and must decide whether party A, B, C or D will be the recipient of her favour.
In such a situation, the rational voter might still seek to influence the formation of government by a strategic vote which is determined more by a wish to see a particular government formed than a particular party elected. If the election was effectively about whether C or D might govern with A, the voter might well opt for D if she prefers AD to AB even if A is the preferred party. Some recent papers have provided evidence that this occurs to a significant degree in some complex multiparty systems (Blais et al 2006; Gschwend 2007; Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Meffert and Gschwend, this issue) . Blais et al. (2006) argue that their results demonstrate that voters can and do vote for governments and not parties, a conclusion that, if valid across a number of systems, would strengthen the case that elections can be forward-looking influences on events rather than simply, as Schumpeter asserted, means of holding leaders to account (see Hobolt and Karp, this 
issue).
However, under some electoral systems voters are given more opportunities to influence government formation. In the popular mixed member system voters each have two votes, one for a list and one for a constituency deputy, and they may split their support across two parties. By doing so they may help the representation of a second party (perhaps without hurting the first one) and may be expressing a desire for these two parties to work together in government (Pappi 2007; Pappi and Thurner 2002) . The split ticket vote may also reflect other priorities, such as a liking for a particular constituency The electoral system that gives voters most scope for expression is the single transferable vote (STV) which is an ordinal voting system that gives the voter the option of ranking candidates (of all parties) in order of preference. This might seem to be a ranking of the parties of those candidates, but where there is more than one candidate of a party the rank order of these running mates does not have to be sequential. In a formal sense the system is a purely candidate centred i one with unlimited choice within party and across party lines, although the evidence indicates that the party labels of candidates are very significant for voters (e.g. Marsh 2000 Marsh , 2007 . However, it is the ballot structure, and the opportunity to rank order candidates, that is most important here. Voters could use their lower preference votes to support candidates who would bolster the chances of a second (or even third) party that they would like to see cooperate with their first choice.
Thus lower preferences could signal a preference for a coalition partner and increase the chance for the latter to win the necessary seats to bring about such a coalition. Parties have often encouraged their supporters to behave in this fashion by asking them to support candidates of certain other parties with their lower preference votes. This appeal has been made both in general terms, where leaders ask voters to support the local candidates of a second party, and also more specifically in local election literature highlighting particular candidates (see e.g. Gallagher and Marsh 2008: xxii, xxv.) However, parties do not always do this and are often content to offer no advice to their followers on what to do with lower preference votes once their own candidates have been supported.
Journalistic comment in the media after the election, particularly when the coalition outcome was not widely foreseen, has drawn on polls and election results to ask whether the particular outcome was something that was signalled by voters (Laver 2000: 131-2; see also 
their first preference vote, which other parties were supported, and the government they would most like to see formed. Ireland provides a context in which, as elsewhere, we can imagine voters making calculations about which party they prefer and which coalition outcome is most desirable. It then provides for much more explicit observable consequences of these calculations than we could hope for under most other electoral systems. The data available also allow us to measure these observable consequences.
Before these data are analysed it is necessary to sketch the context of the study in more detail, to explain the nature of Irish party competition in 2002 and 2007 and to provide some information about the STV system.
The Irish political context
All Irish governments over more than 70 years have included, and been led by In all of these case voters might go on to indicate lower preferences for all of the other candidates.
[ Of course we would not know from any pattern whether the voter was casting a sincere or a strategic vote. Nor would we know whether party was the criterion used to decide the ranking of preferences, as opposed to some other property of the candidates.
However, we can say that if a PD voter did want their party to go into government with FF then the pattern in column 4 would indicate that wish, whereas a 1 for Ahern and a 2 for any non FF candidate would not.
While the ballots themselves are not available for direct study, vi we know from the anecdotal evidence of those who watch votes being counted that while relatively few people complete a full ballot, most go beyond '1', so most people do take advantage of the electoral system to some degree. We also know, not least from the analysis of the Surveys can have real value in this field, and arguably provide a much better basis for making reliable inferences about the preference orders of voters across parties. This can be done in a number of ways, which range from asking people about the parties they voted for to inviting respondents to complete mock ballots and so provide a full record of their voting behaviour. Surveys also provide us with covariates of such behaviour, enabling us to establish how far it reflects coalition preferences or indeed other sets of values.
Data
All of the data used for this analysis come from the exit polls conducted for the national television station in 2002 and 2007. viii These were relatively large samples -
more than 3000 respondents -collected by Lansdowne Market Research Ltd, one of the major market research and opinion polling companies in Ireland. They proved to be very accurate in predicting the final vote outcomes. These data have a number of advantages for our purposes. First, they contain an indication of preference across the various coalitions that might seem plausible. Secondly, they contain questions not only about first preference vote, but also about lower preferences. These are not unproblematic.
Respondents were asked which party they gave their first preference vote to, and were then asked which other parties they voted for. In the case of those who cited more than one other party we have no way of knowing which party ranked second. Given most of the coalition options contained only two parties, this would render the data useless for our purposes if many mentioned more than two parties. Fortunately, very few did so.
From the mock ballots completed for the 2002 Irish National Election Study (Marsh et al. 2008) , we would have expected a larger part of the sample to have indicated that they ranked the candidates of more than two parties, but only 24 per cent did so in the 2002 exit poll, compared to 53 per cent in the election study (see Table 2 ). Moreover, 26 per cent indicated that they voted for the candidates of just one party, compared with only 17 per cent who claimed to do so in the election study. The contrast almost certainly results from the survey instruments used and the context of each poll. A simulated ballot in a more leisurely, in-home, face to face survey was used in the election study as opposed to a quick succession of questions in the on-street exit poll.
ix [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The third advantage is that the large sample size permits us to restrict analysis to those constituencies where all parties ran candidates. This is necessary since a vote consistent with a coalition preference cannot be cast in the absence of appropriate 
Analysis of coalition preferences
The main question to be answered by this analysis is the extent to which people express a pattern of preferences that is consistent with their preferred coalition. Laver (2000) points out that lower preferences may be strategic rather than sincere. He argues that the rational voter would have due regard for the impact of her vote on the governmental formation process after the election. In essence this should mean that a voter acts to increase the chance of the parties she would like to see in government.
xi However, the assumption that voting for a party (or coalition) might rationally be expected to improve its chances of government could in some case be problematic (see also Alvarez and Glasgow 2005) . A voter wishing for a FF/PD government who votes FF may in fact be decreasing the chance of a FF/PD government, because a strong FF party might not need a coalition partner. However, such a voter might still support FF, rather than FG, because only with the largest party could they hope to for a majority two-party coalition. Someone who wants a FF/Labour government and votes Labour might be argued to be reducing the likelihood of such a government because the attractiveness of Labour for FF might well decline as Labour becomes larger. However, given the degree of uncertainty about post election outcomes we will assume here that while voters may be making a strategic choice -voting for a coalition -their preferences will be consistent with their most preferred coalition.
[ We will look first at what voters say about coalitions. This is shown in Table 3 . It should be emphasised again that voters were presented only with these coalition options and asked to choose between them. Some coalitions that people might have preferred were not shown. A 'grand coalition' of FF and FG always attracts support in polls when that choice is offered to respondents, but it has never formed and remains politically [ TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] Table 4 shows the relationship between first preference vote and coalition preference, and it is an extremely close one. Few people cast a first preference vote for a party that is not included in the government that they say they would most like to see However, a wide spread of second preferences is also evident, reflecting perhaps the variety in coalition preferences. We also see a significant affinity between FG and FF, with around one-in-six voters for each party giving a second preference for the other.
This may well represent sincere voting. The parties are similar in policy terms, and both would normally have a prominent TD in a constituency who might attract votes by virtue of his or her reputation for getting things done locally. It might also signal a coalition preference, but with this data we cannot know whether this is the case.
We can now start to put together what we know about coalition options and patterns of party preference. Here we will just be looking at first and second preferences separately, if contingently. We will not at this stage look at combinations of preferences.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We do this using conditional logit, estimating the odds of a given first or second preference conditioned on coalition choice. The two models are very simple ones. The dependent variables are first and second preferences for a party and the only independent variables in each case are, for each party, whether or not the voter wants to see that party in government, as evidenced by the preferred coalition. The dependent variable is second preferences and the independent variables in each case are again, for each first preference party, whether or not the voter wants to see that the second preference party in government, as evidenced by the preferred coalition. In Figure   2 we display odds ratios and confidence intervals. The first set of two points and bars shows the impact of coalition preferences on second preference, given a first vote for FF.
The overall impact is quite modest although all effects are significant. For FF the odds ratio indicating the impact of a coalition preference is less than 2, and it is little more than that in the case of a FG voter. The impact looks somewhat larger in the case of all of the other parties, although the standard errors are larger for these parties and so the confidence intervals are wider. The most striking result concerns Labour voters whose M A N U S C R I P T This is the largest figure in all columns, indicating that most voters do not express a set of preferences consistent with any of the coalition options.
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[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
It may be unwise to assert that those who gave a first and second preference to, for instance, FF or FG, were not expressing a preference for a government on the basis that they later said they preferred some other coalition. Had the list of options given to respondents been different the choices would probably also have been different, and almost certainly some would have opted for FF/FG had that option been on the list.
However, it is possible to say that those who chose, say, FF/PD, but who voted for FF and Independent were not signalling their coalition preferences. On this basis, and leaving aside those who voted for a combination of parties they were not offered as a coalition choice, it might be argued that more than half of all voters who could be safely classified signalled a coalition preference.
Discussion xiii
This paper addresses the issue of whether voters indicate a preference for a government when they vote under STV. It adds to recent literature that suggests that in mixed member systems the second vote could often be seen as indicating a preferred coalition, and to further studies which suggest that coalition preference is a better indicator of a single vote than party preference, at least for some voters. The contribution of this paper is to extend the analysis to a system where electors are given the option to rank the parties in order of preference. The question then becomes: to what extent does this ranking reflect or signal a coalition preference?
The Irish case is a useful one because in addition to the ordinal ballot we do see coalitions form, and because the notion that voters might promote a coalition with their lower preferences is part of the political discourse. There is also a data set covering two elections in which there was a striking contrast in the cues given to some parties' voters.
To a certain degree, the evidence here suggests that the preferences of voters do signal coalition preferences and that some voters may well be acting strategically. Voters' first preferences can be predicted very accurately from coalition preference. There is also evidence that the second preference can also be predicted in this way, although the M A N U S C R I P T
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16 impact of coalition choice is much weaker and is large only in the case of those giving a first preference to one of the smaller patties. Those who vote for one of the two bigger parties are less concerned about whom that party might go into government with than are those who vote for smaller parties. Given these results it is hardly surprising that the ranking of the first two parties is often consistent with the set of parties a voter would like to see forming a coalition, although again this relationship is far from being a perfect one.
While the data used here are ideal in some ways -a large N, a measurement of coalition preference before the outcome is known, the measurement of the rank order of parties and variation across two elections -there are obvious limitations. The most important of these is probably the measurement of coalition preference. This is indicated by a single choice from a limited set of options, which is less than ideal for two reasons.
First, because while this set may be defended as being realistic, it left out the actual outcome in 2007 as well as other possible combinations of three parties. The behaviour of those who vote for a combination of two parties that is not on the list of possible coalitions must be problematic. In general, it can be concluded that most are not voting for any coalitions likely to form (and very few voted PD/Green). At best they might be said to be playing a long game, hoping to boost the chances of such a coalition forming at some time in the future. However, it is also possible that they may simply be casting a sincere vote for the two parties they like best, with no strategic calculations based on likely postelection bargaining. The second reason is that we do not know by how much one option is preferred above others: a rating of different coalitions would be preferable to the ranking available here.
A further limitation is the behavioural operationalisation of party preference, which is thus indistinguishable from vote. Hence we cannot see whether FG voters, who perhaps prefer the PDs to Labour, nevertheless support Labour because they favour a FG/Labour government over any realistic alternative (and FG/PD was never realistic). In the absence of any variable that might provide a basis for assuming what a sincere set of preferences might be for any given voter, we cannot be precise about how far the preferences manifested by votes are sincere or strategic.
What are the implications of this analysis for our understanding of how voters are For many voters it is also likely that their votes reflect more considerations than simply who governs. Voters care about local matters and local candidates and we can be sure that these factors carry some weight in the voter calculus. Indeed, to the extent that a voter is concerned largely with the effectiveness of a deputy to carry out a local service function and to deliver collective benefits to an area, it is understandable that the candidate might matter more than the party, although most would surely expect a deputy's ability to deliver benefits would be greater the more access that deputy had to government. STV is an electoral system which certainly allows the voter to behave in an entirely candidate centred manner. Many claim to do so, although it is arguably that such self-reported motivations exaggerate the importance of candidate and understate the importance of party (Marsh 2007 ) Even so, the candidate factor must explain some of the apparently non-strategic voting we have seen in the above analysis.
What are the implications here for other systems? One is methodological. There are imperfections in this data, as we have highlighted, and some of these might be addressed in future studies both in Ireland and elsewhere. In particular, data are required on the strength of preferences across coalition options, and on the values that might M A N U S C R I P T
18 underpin a sincere party ranking. A second is that the Irish case indicates that when voters are given the opportunity to vote in accordance with their coalition preferences, they appear to do so, particularly when the parties send strong signals. xiv We see this despite the fact that a degree of candidate centred voting can be expected to obscure the manifestations of party based patterns of voting. Where the option to rank parties is not taken as an option to rank candidates -as it might not be in Australia for instance -we would expect to see even stronger strategic voting. A third implication is to reinforce the Gschwend's (2007) point that strategic voting does not simply benefit the larger parties:
there are also benefits to smaller ones even if it is the supporters of the smaller parties who seem to behave more strategically.
Even so, the message of the vote is not always unambiguous. STV obviously allows voters to suggest which combinations of parties they would most like to see in government, and there is evidence that many use STV in this way, but it also allows voters to bring in a number of other considerations and indeed to choose one party for Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties.
They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.
iii For instance, the party accepted the need to keep corporation tax low to encourage direct inward investment. iv This also assumes voters would make the same choice if they had only a first preference vote. v This is one more than the number of valid votes divided by the number of seats plus one: in a situation where 10,000 votes were cast and three seats were to be filled it would be 2,501. vi A partial exception is the record of electronic voting in three constituencies in 2002, analysed by Laver (2004) and discussed below. vii One is that surpluses and the votes of eliminated candidates, apart from those that arise in the first count, will be 'contaminated' because they will comprise both first preferences and second or lower preferences. Thus we do not know with certainty the M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D 2003) , the simulated ballot seems a better instrument. However, we think the data are serviceable if we assume that those who mentioned only one other party as getting their support were indicating their second ranked party when doing so, and eliminate from the analysis all those who mentioned three and more parties.
x These data do have one further advantage, namely that a survey gives a more representative picture of the voter than the partial account given by looking at transferred votes. Only a small proportion of votes are ever transferred, some of which are transferred more than once. There is no theoretical basis for saying that all votes have an equal chance of being transferred and hence being seen and counted for the purposes of analysis. xi Laver (2000) points out that the traditional weakness of FF in the transfer market could owe less to an antipathy to the party among non-FF voters than to the strategic M A N U S C R I P T Kennedy (2006) , who used a different methodology from the one used here, and also from that used by Gallagher-see note 8 above.
